We examine maximin and minimax strategies for players in two-players game with two strategic variables x and p . We consider two patterns of game; one is the x -game in which strategic variables of players are x 's, and the other is the p -game in which strategic variables of players are p 's. We call two players Players A and B, and will show that the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the x -game, and the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the p -game are all equivalent for each player. However, the maximin strategy for Player A and that for Player B are not necessarily equivalent, and they are not necessarily equivalent to their Nash equilibrium strategies in the x -game nor the p -game. But, in a special case, where the objective function of Player B is the opposite of the objective function of Player A, the maximin strategy for Player A and that for Player B are equivalent, and they constitute the Nash equilibrium both in the x -game and the p -game.
Introduction
We examine maximin and minimax strategies for players in two-players game with two strategic variables. We consider two patterns of game; the x -game in which strategic variables of players are x 's, and the p -game in which strategic variables of players are p 's. The maximin strategy for a player is its strategy which maximizes its objective function that is minimized by a strategy of the other player. The minimax strategy for a player is a strategy of the other player which minimizes its objective function that is maximized by its strategy. We call two players Players A and B, and will show that the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the x -game, and the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy in the p -game for each player are all equivalent. However, the maximin strategy (or the minimax strategy) for Player A and that for Player B are not necessarily equivalent (if the game is not symmetric), and they are not necessarily equivalent to their Nash equilibrium strategies in the x -game nor the p -game 3 . But in a special case, where the objective function of Player B is the opposite of the objective function of Player A, the maximin strategy (or the minimax strategy) for Player A and that for Player B are equivalent, and they constitute the Nash equilibrium both in the x -game and the p -game. Thus, in the special case the Nash equilibrium in the x -game and that in the p -game are equivalent. This special case corresponds to relative profit maximization by firms in duopoly with differentiated goods in which two strategic variables are the outputs and the prices. In Section 5 we consider a mixed game in which one of players chooses p and the other player chooses x as their strategic variables, and show that the maximin and the minimax strategies for each player in the mixed game are equivalent to those in the x -game and the p -game. f dx f dx x dp x dp
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Symmetrically,
We assume 0, 0, 0, 0 and 0.
The objective functions of Players A and B are ( , ) and ( , ). 
p-game
The objective functions of Players A and B in the p -game are written as follows.
( ( , ), ( , )) and ( ( , ), ( , )). 
We can rewrite them as follows.
= 0 and = 0.
dx dx dx dx x dp x dp x dp x dp (4) and (5), and the assumptions in (6), they are further rewritten as = 0 and = 0. dx dx dx dx x dp x dp x dp x dp (3), (4) and (5), and the assumptions in (6), they are further rewritten as = 0 and = 0. 
Special case
The results in the previous section do not imply that the maximin strategy (or the minimax strategy) for Player A and that for Player B are equivalent (if the game is not symmetric), and they are equivalent to their Nash equilibrium strategies in the x -game or the p -game. But in a special case the maximin strategy (or the minimax strategy) for Player A and that for Player B are equivalent, and they constitute the Nash equilibrium both in the x -game and the p -game. The conditions for the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for Player A are = 0 and = 0. 
(11) and (13) are not necessarily equivalent.
However, in a special case those conditions are all equivalent. We assume = 0, or = . (8) and (15) 
(17) and (11) are equivalent. Therefore, the maximin strategy (Player A's strategy) and the minimax strategy (Player B's strategy) for Player A in the p -game constitute the Nash equilibrium of the p -game. Since the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for Player A in the x -game and those in the p -game are equivalent, the Nash equilibrium of the x -game and that of the p -game are equivalent.
Summarizing the results, we get the following proposition. (14) f dx x dp ∂ ∂ and = .
Proposition 2 In the special case in which
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A A A f dx dp x dp dp ∂ ∂ Differentiating (1) A A f dx dp x f f dp dp
4 About relative profit maximization under imperfect competition, please see Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato(2013) , Satoh and Tanaka (2013) , Satoh and Tanaka (2014a) , Satoh and Tanaka (2014b) , Tanaka (2013a) , Tanaka (2013b) and Vega-Redondo(1997 dx p x dp dx x x dx x dx p x dp
By similar ways to the arguments in Section 3, we can show that the conditions for the maximin strategy and the conditions for the minimax strategy for Player A are equivalent, and they are = 0 and = 0.
The conditions for the maximin strategy and the minimax strategy for Player B are = 0 and = 0. 
Concluding Remark
We have analyzed maximin and minimax strategies in two-players game with two strategic variables. We assumed differentiability of objective functions of players. In the future research we want to extend the arguments of this paper to a case where objective functions of players are not assumed to be differentiable 5 and to a case of symmetric game with more than two players. In an asymmetric multi-person game with two strategic variables the equivalence results of this paper do not hold.
